20 ideas
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |