Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?st1=Saul A. Kripke', 'Transworld Identity or worldbound Individuals?' and 'Kant's Analytic'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga]
It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga]
If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]