Combining Texts

All the ideas for ''Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'?st1=Michael Devitt', 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)' and 'Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton)'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]