26 ideas
| 3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
| 3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
| 3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
| 3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
| 3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
| 3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |