Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist' and 'On Euclidean Geometry'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]