10 ideas
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |