48 ideas
| 4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
| 8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
| 9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
| 18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
| 10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
| 13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
| 10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
| 6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
| 4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
| 4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
| 4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
| 4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
| 4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
| 4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
| 4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
| 4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
| 4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
| 4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
| 4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
| 4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
| 4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
| 4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
| 4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
| 4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
| 4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
| 4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
| 4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
| 6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
| 6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
| 6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
| 4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
| 6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
| 6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
| 6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
| 6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
| 6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
| 6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
| 6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
| 6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
| 6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
| 6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
| 4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
| 4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
| 6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
| 6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
| 4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |