14 ideas
| 12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
| 12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
| 12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |