16 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |