18 ideas
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
12066 | Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
12082 | If unity is a matter of degree, then essence may also be a matter of degree [Witt] |
12089 | Essences mainly explain the existence of unified substance [Witt] |
12102 | Essential properties of origin are too radically individual for an Aristotelian essence [Witt] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
12085 | Reality is directional [Witt] |