10 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 19053 | Logic would be more natural if negation only referred to predicates [Dummett] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 19052 | Natural language 'not' doesn't apply to sentences [Dummett] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |