18 ideas
18776 | Contextual definitions eliminate descriptions from contexts [Linsky,B] |
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
18774 | Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |