Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?st1=Kurt Gödel', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Phenomenology of Perception'

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10 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
8679 We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
9942 Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
18062 Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
10868 The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
13517 If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
10271 Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
21862 Consciousness is based on 'I can', not on 'I think' [Merleau-Ponty]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
20750 The mind does not unite perceptions, because they flow into one another [Merleau-Ponty]