11 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |