Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?st1=Philippa Foot', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'Commentary on the Metaphysics'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
11193 Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
11209 The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11204 The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
22485 Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
22486 The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22487 Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]