21 ideas
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |