62 ideas
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |