17 ideas
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
| 3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
| 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
| 3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |