18 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |