Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' and 'Rationality and Virtue'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]