29 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
| 18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
| 18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
| 18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
| 18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
| 18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
| 18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
| 18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
| 18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
| 18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
| 18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
| 18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |