Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Conversation: what is it? What is it for?st1=Gilles Deleuze', 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good' and 'Classical Cosmology (frags)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


27 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
The history of philosophy is an agent of power: how can you think if you haven't read the great names? [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Thought should be thrown like a stone from a war-machine [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to become the official language, supporting orthodoxy and the state [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
When I meet objections I just move on; they never contribute anything [Deleuze]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must create new words, and treat them as normal, and as if designating real things. [Deleuze]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Don't assess ideas for truth or justice; look for another idea, and establish a relationship with it [Deleuze]
Dualisms can be undone from within, by tracing connections, and drawing them to a new path [Deleuze]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
Before we seek solutions, it is important to invent problems [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Before Being there is politics [Deleuze]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
A meeting of man and animal can be deterritorialization (like a wasp with an orchid) [Deleuze]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
People consist of many undetermined lines, some rigid, some supple, some 'lines of flight' [Deleuze]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Some lines (of flight) are becomings which escape the system [Deleuze]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Is the cosmos open or closed, mechanical or teleological, alive or inanimate, and created or eternal? [Robinson,TM, by PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]