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All the ideas for '', 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)' and 'Truth and Ontology'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Nietzsche thinks philosophy makes us more profound, but not better [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
How many mediocre thinkers are occupied with influential problems! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Reason is just another organic drive, developing late, and fighting for equality [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
A ground must be about its truth, and not just necessitate it [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truthmaker needs truths to be 'about' something, and that is often unclear [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
If a ball changes from red to white, Truthmaker says some thing must make the change true [Merricks]
Truthmaker says if an entity is removed, some nonexistence truthmaker must replace it [Merricks]
If Truthmaker says each truth is made by the existence of something, the theory had de re modality at is core [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
If 'truth supervenes on being', worlds with the same entities, properties and relations have the same truths [Merricks]
If truth supervenes on being, that won't explain why truth depends on being [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
It is implausible that claims about non-existence are about existing things [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truthmaker isn't the correspondence theory, because it offers no analysis of truth [Merricks]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Speculations about non-existent things are not about existent things, so Truthmaker is false [Merricks]
I am a truthmaker for 'that a human exists', but is it about me? [Merricks]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The totality state is the most plausible truthmaker for negative existential truths [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
First see nature as non-human, then fit ourselves into this view of nature [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Some properties seem to be primitive, but others can be analysed [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Storms are wonderful expressions of free powers! [Nietzsche]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
An object can have a disposition when the revelant conditional is false [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
We begin with concepts of kinds, from individuals; but that is not the essence of individuals [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You believe you existed last year, but your segment doesn't, so they have different beliefs [Merricks]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Nietzsche classified actions by the nature of the agent, not the nature of the act [Nietzsche, by Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Nietzsche failed to see that moral actions can be voluntary without free will [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Nietzsche tried to lead a thought-provoking life [Safranski on Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Initially nihilism was cosmic, but later Nietzsche saw it as a cultural matter [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
Nietzsche urges that nihilism be active, and will nothing itself [Nietzsche, by Zizek]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Flight from boredom leads to art [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Nietzsche was fascinated by a will that can turn against itself [Nietzsche, by Safranski]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Reliving life countless times - this gives the value back to life which religion took away [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Individual development is more important than the state, but a community is necessary [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Nietzsche thinks we should join a society, in order to criticise, heal and renew it [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Every culture loses its identity and power if it lacks a major myth [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists say that things have existed and will exist, not that they are instantaneous [Merricks]
Presentist should deny there is a present time, and just say that things 'exist' [Merricks]
Maybe only presentism allows change, by now having a property, and then lacking it [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
How can a presentist explain an object's having existed? [Merricks]