Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?' and 'The Common-Sense View of Reality'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin]
Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin]
If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin]
The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]