45 ideas
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
| 10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
| 10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
| 10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
| 10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
| 10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
| 10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
| 10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
| 10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |