23 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
3546 | 'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas] |
3547 | Epicureans achieve pleasure through character development [Annas] |
3543 | Cyrenaics pursue pleasure, but don't equate it with happiness [Annas] |
3541 | Ancient ethics uses attractive notions, not imperatives [Annas] |
3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
3551 | Virtue theory tries to explain our duties in terms of our character [Annas] |
3552 | If excessively good actions are admirable but not required, then duty isn't basic [Annas] |
3542 | We should do good when necessary, not maximise it [Annas] |