20 ideas
18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |