15 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |