16 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
| 13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
| 19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |