10 ideas
13099 | Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz] |
10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
5022 | We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |