Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Letters to Foucher' and 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]