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All the ideas for '', 'New system of communication of substances' and 'Propositions'

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19 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
13170 The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13171 Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
13167 We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]