19 ideas
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |