Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?st1=Kurt Gödel', 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' and 'An Ontology of Art'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg]
If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 7. Ontology of Art
If paintings could be perfectly duplicated, it would be a multiple art form [Currie, by Bacharach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]