15 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
| 16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
| 18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |