20 ideas
11178 | The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11176 | The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K] |
11174 | A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
11177 | Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K] |
11173 | Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |