40 ideas
13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
13833 | 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking] |
13834 | Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking] |
13835 | Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking] |
13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking] |
13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking] |
13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking] |
13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking] |
10373 | Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property [Schaffer,J] |
13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking] |
13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking] |
10367 | There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J] |
20945 | Belief is no more rational than is tasting and smelling [Hamann] |
10359 | In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems [Schaffer,J] |
10372 | Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it [Schaffer,J] |
10374 | There are at least ten theories about causal connections [Schaffer,J] |
10366 | Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things [Schaffer,J] |
10377 | Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected' [Schaffer,J] |
10378 | A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way [Schaffer,J] |
10382 | Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10375 | At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction [Schaffer,J] |
10389 | Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained [Schaffer,J] |
10390 | Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes [Schaffer,J] |
10380 | Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it [Schaffer,J] |
10385 | If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10387 | The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations [Schaffer,J] |
10388 | Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations [Schaffer,J] |
10384 | If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive [Schaffer,J] |
10386 | If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation [Schaffer,J] |
10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
10393 | Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J] |
10394 | Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J] |
10376 | The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause [Schaffer,J] |
10381 | All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive [Schaffer,J] |
7666 | God is not a mathematician, but a poet [Hamann, by Berlin] |