21 ideas
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |