69 ideas
5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |