Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'The Rationalists' and 'Letters to Queen Charlotte'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]