11 ideas
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |