Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'The Case for Closure' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid]