Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'Phaedo'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


68 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil]
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil]
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato]
If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato]