17 ideas
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |