21 ideas
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |