22 ideas
20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |