94 ideas
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |