Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?st1=Saul A. Kripke', 'Model Theory for Modal Logic I' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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7 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth

23295

Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

23298

Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth

23297

The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]

3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth

23296

We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5

9560	S5 provides the correct logic for necessity in the broadly logical sense [Fine,K]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

10792

The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

23294

It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]