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All the ideas for '', 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge' and 'The Question of Ontology'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
4261 The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
12215 The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
12211 It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
12209 The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
12214 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
12212 Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12216 Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K]
12218 Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12217 For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12213 Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
4255 Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
4256 The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
4258 Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
4259 External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
4260 Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]