Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy' and 'Theological and other works'

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]